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The paper presents a macroeconomic analysis of a labour- 
managed economy based upon the general equilibrium quantity ra­
tioning paradigm. It is shown that such an economy in which 
firms seek to maximize value added per working hour, and
households seek to maximize utility in consumption and leisure 
may lead to highly perverse and unstable price dynamics, as en­
dogenous features of the system. An easily implemented indexa­
tion scheme is presented which would reverse the direction of 
the dynamics and guide the labour-managed economy to an effi­






















































































































































































After several years of galloping inflation, the internation­
al Monetary Fund has persuaded the Yugoslav government to peg the 
interest rate charged to labour-managed firms in the country's
1industrial sector to one percent above the rate of inflation.
In this paper we present a macrodynamic analysis of a labour-man- 
aged economy which illustrates, within the confines of a relatively 
simple model, the significance and drawbacks of this measure.
The model applies the method of quantity rationing (see 
Grandmont, 1982) to the problem of a labour-managed economy in 
which firms attempt to maximize income per working hour, and households 
(hereafter "consumers") attempt to maximize a utility function 
with arguments consumption and leisure. The agents who, as work­
ers, manage firms, supply goods and demand labour, are of course 
the same agents who in another guise act as consumers and demand 
goods and supply labour; but in their various roles they react to 
different sets of signals. This feature of the labour-managed 
economy enables us to provide a particularly clear analysis of 
both quantity and price dynamics.
This dual role of the worker-managers, as producers and at 
the same time consumers, has been implicitly recognized in sever­
al models of the labour-managed firms such as Sen (1966) where 
the firm attempts to directly maximize the utility of the members 
in consumption and leisure, and Domar (1966) where an income-per- 
member-maximizing cooperative faces an internal labour supply 
constraint. However, on account of the partial equilibrium na­
ture of these analyses, the significance and implications of the 




























































































Our model, therefore, adopts an explicit general equilib­
rium framework, in which we allow non-Walrasian trades to be con 
ducted. In section 2 we assume, in keeping with the quantity-ra 
tioning paradigm, that quantities adjust faster than prices.
This reflects the stylized fact that in the short run, in most 
industries, firms react to changes in demand by initially adjust 
ing quantities (i.e. production), but adjust prices only infre­
quently in response to changes in demand perceived to be of a 
permanent nature. In section 3 we proceed to develop the analy­
sis of the existence of equilibrium, and in section 4 we demon­
strate its "temporary" stability, by considering a quantity tâ­
tonnement mechanism. In section 5 we show that the long-run 
price dynamics imply that the equilibrium so established is un­
stable. as soon as prices become free to adjust. This leads in 
one case to an inflation-spiral, in another case to a deflation- 
collapse of the economy. In the sixth section it is shown how 
the "simple" indexation of fixed costs (rents, or interest pay­
ments for example) to the rate of inflation eliminates this in­
stability but does not, by itself, result in efficiency. Final­
ly, a proposal which we refer to as "progressive rent indexation 
is presented which will guide our labour-managed economy towards 





























































































We assume that the economy consists of one firm and one con­
sumer-worker. This is not a restriction of generality since the 
analysis could easily be extended to the case of having m identi­
cal firms and n identical consumers. However, setting m = n = 1 
avoids an otherwise more complicated notation and allows us to 
represent the whole analysis graphically which will be very in­
structive .
2.1 Firm1s Behaviour
The firm produces a composite consumption good using labour 
by means of a differentiable production technology c = f (1) with 
f' > 0, f" < 0, f(0) 0 and f' (0) = °°. It has to pay a fixed
rent r for the use of other inputs the level of which is fixed 
throughout the period under consideration. For given output 
price p, the firm may observe constraints on consumer goods de­
mand, c, and on labour supply, I. The firm's objective is to 
maximize value-added per working hour, i.e. V = /pf (1) - r//l. 
Since p cannot be influenced by the firm, this amounts to the 
same as maximizing real value-added per hour, i.e.
f(1) " £ vmax --- - -- - 1)1 P P
s . t . (i) 1 > 0
(ii) 1 < I
(iii) f (1) < c
The solution to the program yields the firm's effective la-
cLir — — s r ” “bour demand 1 (— ,0 ,1 ) and its effective goods supply c (— ,c,l) =
d r — — ^ d# r s» rf(l (— ,c,l)). Denoting with 1 (— ) and c (— ) the firm's uncon­




























































































above problem are deleted) and setting 1:= min {l,f "'(c)}, the
firm's effective labour demand is evidently
_ . Tld*.r, =, min {1 (-),1} , if Ï > f"1 (£ )
id (ï,ï> =• P
if Ï < f_1
P
P _ o (-)P
Figure 1 illustrates the firm's decision problem.
Figure 1
The real value-added associated with the firm's uncon­



























































































It is immediate to see that
dld*
d(-)P
> 0 < 0
2.2 Consumer's Behaviour
The consumer receives a fixed rent income r and he can en­
gage to work a number of hours 1 for which he then receives the 
labour income VI, for given value-added per hour V. This means 
that, to the consumer, V is an exogenously given datum. Possi­
bly observing constraints on consumer goods supply, c, and on 






c £ 0 
0 < 1 < L 
pc < VI + r 
c < c
(v) 1 < Ï
where u(c,l) = U(c, L - 1) is a utility function which is in­
creasing in c, decreasing in 1, and U is strictly quasi-con­
cave; L denotes the upper bound of hours the consumer can phys­
ically work.
The solution to the above problem yields the consumer's
g v r - -effective labour supply 1 (— , — ,c,l) and his effective consump­
tion goods demand c^(— ,— ,c,Ï), the latter being equal to
P P




























































































silVir V rfunction. If 1 ) and c ) denote the consumer's uncon-P P P P
strained labour supply and goods demand (i.e. when (iv) and (v) 
in the above problem are deleted), then quasi-concavity of U im­
plies
s V r - - . s* .V r, T rn1 (~,-,c,l) = min {1 , 1, max {0,


































































































It will prove very useful below to work with the consumer's
2Toffer curve for given — , which shows how households' labour sup-
P Vply and consumer goods demand is varied as — is varied, i.e.














Assuming furthermore that u(0,0) < u(c,l) whenever c > 0 and 0 <




























































































- > r. This implies in particular that the slope of the offer
Jr
curve H(0) in (l,c) = (0,0) is finite (more precisely: zero).
We will use this fact below.
3. Equilibrium
We look for a list of price and quantity signals which lead 
the firm and the consumer to actions which are consistent with 
each other. More precisely, this requires that the goods price 
p, the rent level r, the value-added per hour V and the quantity 
constraints c and 1 are such that the corresponding effective 
supplies equal the effective demands, both for the consumption 
good and for labour. This is indeed verified in a state of 
equilibrium as introduced in the following definition.




1 S "  ( £ , £ )P P
ld*(£ ) - P
































































































(iv) V— = max P
(v) c = f(l)
An equilibrium is called unconstrained if conditions (i) and (ii) 
are fulfilled with equality. Otherwise it is an equilibrium with 
rationing.
In an equilibrium, the quantity constraints I and c are also 
the quantities transacted between the firm and the consumer. 
Conditions (i) and (ii) ensure that these quantities are consist­
ent with the principle of voluntariness of trade. (iii) is an 
efficiency requirement and states that at most one market side is 
rationed. (iv) and (v) ensure the consistency of the equilibrium 
allocation.
We next illustrate the notion of equilibrium in distinguish­






























































































In Fig. 4 (l,c) represents an unconstrained equilibrium. In-
— d s *  V r — —deed, 1 = 1 (— ) = 1 Note, however, that ( l ^ c 1) is anp p'p '
equilibrium (with rationing), too.
(2) Equilibrium with consumer1s rationing
Figure 5
In this case rents and prices are such that the firm demands 
d# — —labour 1 = 1  and supplies goods c = c. This leads to the real
Vvalue-added — at which the consumer's unconstrained labour supply




























































































(3) Equilibrium with firm's rationing
Figure 6
— — ĝ . —
In (l,c) the consumer supplies 1 = 1  and demands c =
d$f —whereas the firm’s unconstrained labour demand is 1 > 1  and
ĝ l —its unconstrained goods supply is c > c. Note that in con­
trast to the previous case, real rents are now "too high" rela 































































































In this case the only equilibrium is the trivial equi-librium
(l,c) = (0,0) .
In each of the situations (1) - (3) there exist two non­
trivial equilibria (other than the trivial equilibrium at (0,0)), 
namely (l,c) and (ï',c'). However, as we will show below, only 
the equilibria (ï,c) are (locally) stable in the sense that they 
can be obtained as limit points o f  a suitable quantity tâtonne­
ment process. Therefore, we concentrate in the following on the 
(welfare superior) equilibria (l,c).
From Figures 4-7 it is evident that a non-trivial equilibri­
um exists if and only if



























































































where we have written f instead of graph (f) by a slight abuse
of notation. Since H(0) n  f  0 and since the slope of H(0) in
(l,c) = (0,0) is finite as we established in the discussion of the
consumer's behaviour, a continuity argument ensures the exist- 
rence of — > 0 such that (1) holds. More precisely, the relation P
between the level of the real rent and the associated equilibri-
um employment is shown in Fig. 8, where 1 and (— ) denote theP
values belonging to an unconstrained equilibrium. From this it
is obvious that employment is highest if the equilibrium is un-
r rconstrained. For — > (—) on the other hand, economic activityP P






























































































The equilibrium notion introduced above describes consist­
ent allocations but we have not said so far how such an alloca­
tion can actually be reached. To fill this gap, we now distin­
guish the signals Ï, c, p, r and V so that we keep p and r fixed 
(as before) but we now start with some (any) 1 > 0 and with as­
sociated c and V . If (1 ,c ,p,r,V ) is not an equilibrium, we o o o o o
want to find (1^/C^V^), (l^fC^/V^), • • • * (1^ * ,̂ n^ ' * * *
such that (Ï ,c ,V ) arises as an economically meaningful reac- n n n
tion of economic agents from the previously quoted signal (ln_^,
c „,P,r,V „ ) and such that (ï ,c ,V ) -> (ï,c,V) where (l,c,p,n-1 n-1 n n n
r,V) is an equilibrium. In other words, we will define a quan­
tity tâtonnement process which converges to some equilibrium.
Suppose the firm receives the signal 1 k 0 as an upper 
bound for contracting labour services. Its effective labour de­
mand then is
f  min {1 , ld* (— ) , if ld > f 1 (— )o p o p
0 ,d _-1 ,r. if 1 < f (-)o p
which gives rise to the real value-added per hour 
V1—  = max {----— —— — , 0}P , d
This value is communicated to the consumer who accordingly de-
V.1 ITtermines his unconstrained labour supply 1 (— .— ). The result-P P
ing new upper bound for contracting labour services then is
, V,, . r,dK,r. .s k . 1 r. ,1. = m m  {1 (-) , 1 — ,~) }1 P P P




























































































12 is obtained, which in turn yields 1 and so on. Altogether,
this defines a sequence (l ,c ,r,p,V } with c = f(l ) andn' n n n n n
V = max {/f(ld) - - 7/ld , 0} n — n p— n
In order to illustrate the process just described, consid­
er Figure 9. There, ld* (— ) > 1 and I 1 < 1 <1. Thus ld =
V ? ° V 1
1Q < and hence 11 = min (ld*(^) , =
V. V
S X  1 IT — q  w 1 t1 (— > 1 . On the other hand, 1. < 1 since 1 * (— ,— ) <p P o 1 p 'p
rc - —5 .̂ p 2T






























































































_ 5 36 1 3TNext, if 0 < 1 < 1', then 1 (-— *.— ) < 1 (-) and hence 1. <o P P P 1
1 . It follows easily that 1 -> 0.o n v
Finally, if 1 >1, then again Is* (— ,-) < 1 (— ) and hence o P P P
Thus in this case one has 1 -* I.n
V,
1. < 1 but 1. > 1. 1 o 1
In Figure 9 the offer curve H (— ) was positively sloped in
the point (l,c). However, a situation with a backward bending 
offer curve is shown in Figure 10. There the sequence (ln) is 
not monotone but it oscillates around the equilibrium. However,




























































































Summarizing the dynamics in the case of equilibrium with
firm's rationing (Figs. 9, 10) one has that (l,c) is (locally)
stable, i.e. for 1 >1', whereas (l',c') is unstable ando
(l,c) = (0,0) is again locally stable (for 1 < 1'). The sameo
kind of analysis just performed shows that this result holds
for the other types of equilibria as well. Whenever — is such
that there exists a non-trivial equilibrium, then 1 -*• 1 if
1 >1' and 1 ■> 0 if 1 < 1'. If there exists no non-trivialo n o
equilibrium, then 1 ->• 0 whatever is the value 1 .n o
Thus in order that our labour-managed economy works at
all, its activity must be pushed to a sufficiently high level,
i.e. in our model to an initiating value 1 beyond the critical
value I '.
5. Price Adjustment
So far our analysis has been performed as if the goods 
price p and the rent level r were exogenously fixed parameters. 
We described allocations consistent with the values of these 
parameters. This led us to the notion of equilibrium (with ra­
tioning) . Now, if p and r are such that they are not compati­
ble with unconstrained equilibrium, then either the firm or the 
consumer would like to trade in excess of what it or he (or 
she) actually transacts. But this fact is likely to induce 
price changes. A firm that perceives a permanent excess demand 
for its output is tempted to increase the price for its good, 
thus increasing real value-added per hour. A lack of demand on 
the other hand is likely to induce the firm to reduce the 
price.
In order to embody this phenomenon in our analysis, we now 




























































































periods of equal length such that in each period t the goods 
price remains fixed at value p̂ _. For this price and a time- 
independent rent level r, the economy reaches an equilibrium 
by means of a quantity tâtonnement process as described in the 
previous section. We assume that 1 > 1 1 so that always the
stable non-trivial equilibrium occurs whenever p and r are 
such that it exists. At the equilibrium, trades take place.
If unconstrained demand and supply for the consumption good do 
not match, then the price is revised at the end of the old or 
the beginning of the new period. The revised price p  ̂ re­
mains fixed in period t+1, trades take place, and so on. In 
this way a sequence of prices and associated allocations is 
formed the properties of which can be studied.
As to the price adjustment rule, we follow the tradi­
tional assumption that p increases whenever there is excess 
demand and p decreases in the case of excess supply. Formally,
, , , d*- s*.pt+1 = Pt + *(C - ct )
with ip : R
only if x f  0
R monotone increasing, and ip (x) ^ 0 if and
2 In order to see the consequences of these as-
sumptions, we consider again Figure 8. There, for each real
r —rent level — is shown the associated employment level 1. Sup-
^ r r %pose now that in period t p is such that —  < (— ) . ThenP ̂ P
there is excess demand for the consumption good and hence
Pt+1 > Pf But then t+1
-, and since \p (. ) is increasing,
we get galloping inflation. On the other hand, if
then p̂ _ , „ < p. and — *t+1 *t p
~  > (£ )* 
Pt PAgain since ip (. ) is increasing,
t+1
the real rent crosses the "collapse" level (—) in a finite num-P




























































































price adjustment, our labour-managed economy is highly unstable. 
This is summarized in Figure 11.
Figure 11
6. Rent Indexation
The result of the foregoing analysis of price adjustment is 
alarming, indeed. If prices are free to vary but rents are kept 
fixed, then the economy cannot escape a disastrous end. Of 
course, the assumption of rents remaining unchanged is unneces­
sarily restrictive and in fact we will give it up now; but one 
should keep in mind that rent adjustment seems to arise in a far 




























































































cess demands or supplies are easily to be observed on the goods 
market, giving a guide to price adjustment. For the rents how­
ever there does not necessarily exist something like "the" mar­
ket for rents, and even if there did, rental payments are usu­
ally stipulated in terms of a contract, and would thus be rath­
er inflexible and not easy to change in the short and even me­
dium term.
One can think, however, of a superior authority like the 
government or, as has in fact been the case with Yugoslavia, 
the International Monetary Fund, which imposes a rent adjust­
ment by way of indexing rents on the price level or, equiva­
lently, on the inflation rate. For example, setting
ensures r, ,./p. . = r./p. =: r for all t. However, if r /t+1 t+1 t t
(r/p)*, where (r/p)* is the real rent belonging to an uncon­
strained equilibrium and hence maximal employment and welfare, 
then this "simple rent indexation" prevents the economy from 
achieving its efficient level of operation. In order to avoid 
this, a "progressive rent indexation" to be explained below has 
to be implemented.
Denote with
the inflation rate in period t. Then we set
(2) rt := <}> (it
where <j> : Â l ,
) rt-1




























































































= 1 if 1t = 0
> 1 + it , if 1t > 0
-p
+V if Lt < 0
For example consider r and p such that (r /p ) <
L. I l— ”  I L  “  I L. I
(r/p) . Then > Pt_^ and hence i > 0. Furthermore,
t 11 + V ^ - l  — > ---- —------- t~1
5t-1
Hence the too low real rent (r , / p .  .) becomes increased int-1 t-1
spite of the fact that p is bigger than p . As an example,t t — 1
consider
<J>Ut) = d  + it)a
For a > 1 rent indexation is "progressive" whereas for a = 1 
it is "simple". For a = 0 there is no rent adjustment at all.
Finally consider 
(3) rt = it + c
where c is some positive constant. This is the IMF inspired 
scheme referred to in the introduction. (Evidently it is not 
of the shape suggested by (2)). The IMF scheme is intended to 
increase the rent level if the price level is too high and, as 
a consequence, the level of real rent is too low. Though this 
intention is fulfilled in a first shot sense, it is easy to see 
that this initial effect is soon reversed and that the under­




































































































If prices are steadily increasing, it is clear that both terms 
on the right-hand side must fall, and hence the same holds for
the real rent level is smaller than the value associated
with unconstrained equilibrium, the real rents diverge from 
^rj instead of approaching it. Thus the IMF scheme fails to
lead the economy to the efficient level of operation.
Conclusion
In this paper we have considered a simple macroeconomic 
model of a labour-managed economy basing our approach on the 
general equilibrium quantity rationing paradigm. Most previ­
ous analysis of labour-managed systems have been based upon a
partial equilibrium methodology (with some notable ex-
3ceptions), and, although some of those studies have touched 
on the issues addressed in this paper, it has required a gen­
eral equilibrium framework to tease out the full implications 
of the systemic features of labour-management for such macro- 
economic variables as inflation and employment.
Using this approach we have been able to demonstrate the 
existence of various types of temporary equilibria with ra­
tioning. Those, for example, where firms are rationed in 
their ability to hire as much labour as they would wish 
since, in the fix-price short run, real rents are "too high", 
and, being distributed as income, reduce the incentive for 
workers, as members of households, to supply the labour




























































































which, as enterprise managers, they seek to engage. In another 
case, real rents are too low with consequent rationing of con­
sumers, rather than firms, for analogous reasons. Once a short- 
run equilibrium is established firms are then free to consider 
the divergence of their actual transactions with notional market 
supplies and demands and adjust prices accordingly in prepara­
tion for the next period's quantity tâtonnement under the newly 
established prices. The resulting price dynamics are shown to 
be perverse and highly unstable, giving rise to either infla­
tion, a persistent reduction in real rents and in employment, or 
conversely in deflation, and a persistent increase in real rents 
which threatens economic collapse.
However, by adopting a suitable "progressive rent indexa­
tion" scheme, these perverse price dynamics can be turned around 
so as to guide the economy to its full employment equilibrium 
and eliminate both inflationary and deflationary tendencies.
Finally, we have shown that the particular indexation 
scheme suggested by the IMF for Yugoslavia is unable to achieve 
these effects and would therefore recuire a modification; for 





















































































































































































1. Currently (1st quarter, 1985) around 60%. For more details 
of the Yugoslav stabilization programme see OECD (1984) .
o TvT -i- , , . . , d* s*-, , . d* - . , s* - , ,2. Note that  ̂(c^ - cfc ) = i|>{ (c “ ct) “ (c “ c )} and that
by the short-sided rule implicit in the definition of equi­
librium at least one of the terms (c^* - c^) and (c^* - ĉ _) 
is zero. Thus it is always clear to firms whether they 
should raise or lower the price.






















































































































































































Domar, E. (1966) The Soviet collective farm as a producer coop­
erative, American Economic Review, 56, 4, 737-757.
Drèze, J.H. (1975) Existence of an exchange equilibrium under 
price rigidities, International Economic Review, 16, 301- 
320.
Drèze, J.H. (1976) Some theory of labour management and partic­
ipation, Econometrica, 44, 6,
Drèz:e, J.H. (1983) Labour Management and Labour Contracts. A 
General Equilibrium Approach, Irjô Jahnsson Lectures,
forthcoming.
Grandmont, J.M. (1982) Temporary general equilibrium theory,
in: K.J. Arrow and M.D. Intriligator (eds.), Handbook of
Mathematical Economics, Amsterdam, North-Holland.
OECD (1934) OECD Economic Surveys - Yugoslavia, Paris, Organi­
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Sen, A.K. (1966) Labour allocation in a cooperative enterprise, 
Review of Economic Studies, 33, 361-371.
Vanek, J. (1970) General Theory of Labour-Managed Market Economies, 





















































































































































































WORKING PAPERS ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT
1: Jacques PELKMANS The European Community and the Newly 
Industrialized Countries
3: Aldo RUSTICHINI Seasonality in Eurodollar Interest 
Rates
9: Manfred E. STREIT Information Processing in Futures 
Markets. An Essay on the Adequacy 
of an Abstraction
10: Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI When Workers Save and Invest: Some 
Kaldorian Dynamics




On Lindahl's Theory of Distribution
22: Don PATINKIN Paul A. Samuelson on Monetary Theory
23: Marcello DE CECCO Inflation and Structural Change in 
the Euro-Dollar Market
24: Marcello DE CECCO The Vicious/Virtuous Circle Debate 
in the '20s and the '70s
25: Manfred E. STREIT Modelling, Managing and Monitoring 
Futures Trading: Frontiers of 
Analytical Inquiry
26 : Domenico Mario NUTI Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe: 
Prospects and Repercussions
34: Jean-Paul FITOUSSI Modern Macroeconomic Theory: An 
Overview
35: Richard M. GOODWIN
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
Economic Systems and their 
Regulation
46: Alessandra Venturini Is the Bargaining Theory Still an 
Effective Framework of Analysis 
for Strike Patterns in Europe?
47: Richard M. GOODWIN Schumpeter: The Man I Knew
48: Jean-Paul FITOUSSI 
Daniel SZPIRO
Politique de l'Emploi et Réduction 
de la Durée du Travail
56: Bere RUSTEM
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
Preferences in Policy Optimization 




























































































No. 60: Jean-Paul FITOUSSI Adjusting to Competitive Depression. 
The Case of the Reduction in Working 
Time
No. 64: Marcello DE CECCO Italian Monetary Policy in the 1980s
No. 65: Gianpaolo ROSSINI Intra-Industry Trade in Two Areas: 
Some Aspects of Trade Within and 
Outside a Custom Union
No. 66: Wolfgang GEBAUER Euromarkets and Monetary Control: 
The Deutschmark Case
No. 67: Gerd WEINRICH On the Theory of Effective Demand 
Under Stochastic Rationing
No. 68: Saul ESTRIN 
Derek C. JONES
The Effects of Worker Participation 
upon Productivity in French 
Producer Cooperatives
No. 69: Bere RUSTEM 
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
On the Formalization of Political 
Preferences: A Contribution to 
the Frischian Scheme
No. 72: Wolfgang GEBAUER Inflation and Interest: the Fisher 
Theorem Revisited
No. 75: Sheila A. CHAPMAN Eastern Hard Currency Debt 1970- 
1983. An Overview
No. 90: Will BARTLETT Unemployment, Migration and Indus­
trialization in Yugoslavia, 1958- 
1982
No. 91: Wolfgang GEBAUER Kondratieff's Long Waves
No. 92: Elizabeth DE GHELLINCK 
Paul A. GEROSKI 
Alexis JACQUEMIN
Inter-Industry and Inter-Temporal 
Variations in the Effect of Trade 
on Industry Performance
84/103: Marcello DE CECCO The International Debt Problem in 
the Interwar Period
84/105: Derek C. JONES The Economic Performance of Producer 
Cooperatives within Command Economies 
Evidence for the Case of Poland
84/111: Jean-Paul FITOUSSI 
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
A Non-Linear Model of Fluctuations 
in Output in a Mixed Economy





























































































84/114: Saul ESTRIN 
Jan SVEJNAR
Explanations of Earnings in Yugoslavia: 
the Capital and Labor Schools Compared
84/116: Reinhard JOHN On the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference 
without Demand Continuity Assumptions
84/118: Pierre DEHEZ Monopolistic Equilibrium and Involuntary 
Unemployment
84/119: Domenico Mario NUTI Economic and Financial Evaluation of 
Investment Projects: General Principles 
and E.C. Procedures
84/120: Marcello DE CECCO Monetary Theory and Roman History
84/121: Marcello DE CECCO International and Transnational 
Financial Relations
84/122: Marcello DE CECCO Modes of Financial Development: 




Multisectoral Models and Joint 
Production
84/126: John CABLE Employee Participation and Firm Perfor­
mance: a Prisoners' Dilemma Framework
84/127: Jesper JESPERSEN Financial Model Building and Financial 
Multipliers of the Danish Economy
84/128: Ugo PAGANO Welfare, Productivity and Self-Management
85/155: François DUCHENE Beyond the First C.A.P.
85/156: Domenico Mario NUTI Political and Economic Fluctuations in 
the Socialist System
85/157: Christophe DEISSENBERG On the Determination of Macroeconomic 
Policies with Robust Outcome
85/161: Domenico Mario NUTI A Critique of Orwell's Oligarchic 
Collectivism as an Economic System
85/162: Will BARTLETT Optimal Employment and Investment 
Policies in Self-Financed Producer 
Cooperatives






































































































: Jean JASKOLD GABSZEWICZ 
Paolo GARELLA
Subjective Price Search and Price 
Competition
: Dwight M. JAFFEE Term Structure Intermediation
: Gerd WEINRICH Price and Wage Dynamics in a Simple
Macroeconomic Model with Stochastic 
Rationing
: Domenico Mario NUTI Economic Planning in Market Economies
: Will BARTLETT 
Gerd WEINRICH
: Jesper JESPERSEN
Instability and Indexation in a Labour- 
Managed Economy - A General Equilibrium 
Quantity Rationing Approach
Some Reflexions on the Longer Term Con­
sequences of a Mounting Public Debt
: Jean JASKOLD GABSZEWICZ 
Paolo GARELLA
Scattered Sellers and Ill-Informed Buyers 
A Model of Price Dispersion
copies of these Working Papers can be obtained from:
Secretariat Economics Department 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana




























































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the European 
University Institute, Florence.
Copies can be obtained free of charge —  depending on the availability 
of stocks —  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole(FI) 
Italy



























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE
To :The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana



































































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 
EUI WORKING PAPERS
PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE May 1985
1: Jacques PELKMANS The European Community and the Newly 
Industrialized Countries *
2: Joseph H.H. WEILER Supranationalism Revisited - 
Retrospective and Prospective. The 
European Communities After Thirty 
Years *
3: Aldo RUSTICHINI Seasonality in Eurodollar Interest 
Rates
4: Mauro CAPPELLETTI/ 
David GOLAY
Judicial Review, Transnational and 
Federal: Impact on Integration
5: Leonard GLESKE The European Monetary System: Present 
Situation and Future Prospects *
6: Manfred HINZ Massenkult und Todessymtaolik in der 
national-sozialistischen Architektur *
7: Wilhelm BURKLIN The "Greens" and the "New Politics": 
Goodbye to the Three-Party System?
8: Athanasios MOULAKIS Unilateralism or the Shadow of 
Confusion *
9: Manfred E. STREIT Information Processing in Futures 
Markets. An Essay on the Adequacy of 
an Abstraction *
10:Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI When Workers Save and Invest: Some 
Kaldorian Dynamics *
11:Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI A Neo-Cambridge Model of Income 
Distribution and Unemployment *
12:Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI/ 
Guglielmo CHIODI
On Lindahl's Theory of Distribution *
13:Gunther TEUBNER Reflexive Rationalitaet des Rechts *
14:Gunther TEUBNER Substantive and Reflexive Elements in 
Modern Law *
15:Jens ALBER Some Causes and Consequences of Social 
Security Expenditure Development in 
Western Europe, 1949-1977 *




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE May 1985
16:Ian BUDGE Democratic Party Government: Formation 
and Functioning in Twenty-One 
Countries *
17:Hans DAALDER Parties and Political Mobilization: An 
Initial Mapping *
18:Giuseppe DI PALMA Party Government and Democratic 
Reproducibility: The Dilemma of New 
Democracies *
19:Richard S. KATZ Party Government: A Rationalistic 
Conception *
20:Juerg STEINER Decision Process and Policy Outcome: 
An Attempt to Conceptualize the 
Problem at the Cross-National Level *
21:Jens ALBER The Emergence of Welfare Classes in 
West Germany: Theoretical Perspectives 
and Empirical Evidence *
22:Don PATINKIN Paul A. Samuelson and Monetary Theory
23:Marcello DE CECCO Inflation and Structural Change in the 
Euro-Dollar Market *
24:Marcello DE CECCO The Vicious/Virtuous Circle Debate in 
the '20s and the '70s *
25:Manfred E. STREIT Modelling, Managing and Monitoring 
Futures Trading: Frontiers of 
Analytical Inquiry *
26:Domenico Mario NUTI Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe - 
Prospects and Repercussions
27:Terence C. DAINTITH Legal Analysis of Economic Policy *
28:Frank C. CASTLES/ 
Peter MAIR
Left-Right Political Scales: Some 
Expert Judgements *
29:Karl HOHMANN The Ability of German Political 
Parties to Resolve the Given Problems: 
the Situation in 1982 *
30:Max KAASE The Concept of Political Culture: Its 
Meaning for Comparative Political 
Research *




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE May 1985
31:Klaus TOEPFER Possibilities and Limitations of a 
Regional Economic Development Policy 
in the Federal Republic of Germany *
32:Ronald INGLEHART The Changing Structure of Political 
Cleavages Among West European Elites 
and Publics *
33:Moshe LISSAK Boundaries and Institutional Linkages 
Between Elites: Some Illustrations 
from Civil-Military Elites in Israel *
34:Jean-Paul FITOUSSI Modern Macroeconomic Theory: An 
Overview *
35:Richard M. GOODWIN/ 
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
Economic Systems and their Regulation*
36:Maria MAGUIRE The Growth of Income Maintenance 
Expenditure in Ireland, 1951-1979 *
37:G. LOWELL FIELD/ 
John HIGLEY
The States of National Elites and the 
Stability of Political Institutions in 
81 Nations, 1950-1982
38:Dietrich HERZOG New Protest Elites in the Political 
System of West Berlin: The Eclipse of 
Consensus? *
39:Edward 0. LAUMANN/ 
David KNOKE




Class and Prestige Origins in the 
American Elite
41:Peter MAIR Issue-Dimensions and Party Strategies 
in the Irish republic 1948-1981:The 
Evidence of Manifestos
42‘.Joseph H.H. WEILER Israel and the Creation of a Palestine 
State. The Art of the Impossible and 
the Possible *
43:Franz Urban PAPPI Boundary Specification and Structural 




Zur Implementation von 
Gerichtsurteilen. Hypothesen zu den 
Wirkungsbedingungen von Entscheidungen 
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts *




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE May 1985
45:Alexis PAULY/ 
René DIEDERICH
Migrant Workers and Civil Liberties *
46:Alessandra VENTURINI Is the Bargaining Theory Still an 
Effective Framework of Analysis for 
Strike Patterns in Europe? *
47:Richard A. GOODWIN Schumpeter: The Man I Knew
48:J.P. FITOUSSI/ 
Daniel SZPIRO
Politique de l'Emploi et Réduction de 
la Durée du Travail
49:Bruno DE WITTE Retour à Costa. La Primauté du Droit 
Communautaire à la Lumière du Droit 
International
50:Massimo A. BENEDETTELLI Eguaglianza e Libera Circolazione dei 
Lavoratori: Principio di Eguaglianza e 
Divieti di Discriminazione nella 
Giurisprudenza Comunitaria in Materia 
di Diritti di Mobilità Territoriale e 
Professionale dei Lavoratori
51:Gunther TEUBNER Corporate Responsability as a Problem 
of Company Constitution *
52:Erich SCHANZE Potentials and Limits of Economic 
Analysis: The Constitution of the Firm
53:Maurizio COTTA Career and Recruitment Patterns of 
Italian Legislators. A Contribution of 
the Understanding of a Polarized 
System *
54:Mattei DOGAN How to become a Cabinet Minister in 
Italy: Unwritten Rules of the 
Political Game *
55:Mariano BAENA DEL ALCAZAR/ 
Narciso PIZARRO




Preferences in Policy Optimization and 
Optimal Economic Policy
57‘.Giorgio FREDDI Bureaucratic Rationalities and the 
Prospect for Party Government *
59 : Christopher Hill/ 
James MAYALL
The Sanctions Problem: International 
and European Perspectives




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE May 1985
60:Jean-Paul FITOUSSI Adjusting to Competitive Depression. 
The Case of the Reduction in Working 
Time
61:Philippe LEFORT Idéologie et Morale Bourgeoise de la 
Famille dans le Ménager de Paris et le 
Second Libro di Famiglia, de L.B. 
Alberti *
62:Peter BROCKMEIER Die Dichter und das Kritisieren
63 :Hans-Martin PAWLOWSKI Law and Social Conflict
64:Marcello DE CECCO Italian Monetary Policy in the 1980s *
65:Gianpaolo ROSSINI Intraindustry Trade in Two Areas: Some 
Aspects of Trade Within and Outside a 
Custom Union
66:Wolfgang GEBAUER Euromarkets and Monetary Control : The 
Deutschemark Case
67:Gerd WEINRICH On the Theory of Effective Demand 
under Stochastic Rationing
68 : Saul ESTRIN/ 
Derek C. JONES
The Effects of Worker Participation 




On the Formalization of Political 
Preferences : A Contribution to • the 
Frischian Scheme *
70:Werner MAIHOFER Politique et Morale *
71:Samuel COHN Five Centuries of Dying in Siena: 
Comparison with Southern France *
72:Wolfgang GEBAUER Inflation and Interest: the Fisher 
Theorem Revisited
73:Patrick NERHOT Rationalism and the Modern State *
' 74:Philippe SCHMITTER Democratic Theory and Neo-Corporatist 
Practice *
75:Sheila A. CHAPMAN Eastern Hard Currency Debt 1970-83. An 
Overview




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE May 1985
76:Richard GRIFFITHS Economic Reconstruction Policy in the 
Netherlands and its International 
Consequences, May 1945 - March 1951 *
77:Scott NEWTON The 1949 Sterling Crisis and British 
Policy towards European Integration *
78:Giorgio FODOR Why did Europe need a Marshall Plan in 
1947? *
79:Philippe MIOCHE The Origins of the Monnet Plan: How a 
Transistory Experiment answered to 
Deep-Rooted Needs
80:Werner ABELSHAUSER The Economic Policy of Ludwig Erhard
81:Helge PHARO The Domestic and International 
Implications of Norwegian 
Reconstruction
82:Heiner R. ADAMSEN Investitionspolitik in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1951 *
83:Jean BOUVIER Le Plan Monnet et l'Economie Française 
1947-1952 *
84:Mariuccia SALVATI Industrial and Economie Policy in the 
Italian Reconstruction *
85:William DIEBOLD , Jr. Trade and Payments in Western 
Europe in Historical Perspective: 
A Personal View By an Interested 
Party
86:Frances LYNCH French Reconstruction in a European 
Context
87:Gunther TEUBNER Verrechtlichung. Begriffe, Merkmale, 
Grenzen, Auswege *
88:Maria SPINEDI Les Crimes Internationaux de l'Etat 
dans les Travaux de Codification de la 
Responsabilité des Etats Entrepris par 
les Nations Unies *
89 :Jelle VISSER Dimensions of Union Growth in Postwar 
Western Europe
90:Will BARTLETT Unemployment, Migration and 
Industrialization in Yugoslavia, 1958- 
1977




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE May 1985
91:Wolfgang GEBAUER Kondratieff's Long Waves
92:Elisabeth DE GHELLINCK/ 
Paul A. GEROSKI/
Alexis JACQUEMIN
Inter-Industry and Inter-Temporal 






durch Reflexives Recht *
94:Wolfgang STREECK/
Philippe C. SCHMITTER
Community, Market, State- and 
Associations. The Prospective 
Contribution of Interest Governance 
to Social Order
95:Nigel GRIFFIN "Virtue Versus Letters": The Society 
of Jesus 1550-1580 and the Export of 
an Idea
96:Andreas KUNZ Arbeitsbeziehungen und 
Arbeitskonflikte im oeffentlichen 
Sektor. Deutschland und 
Grossbntannien im Vergleich 1914-1924 
*
97:Wolfgang STREECK Neo-Corporatist Industrial Relations 
and the Economic Crisis in West 
Germany *
98:Simon A. HORNER The Isle of Man and the Channel 
Islands - A Study of their Status 
under Constitutional, International 
and European Law
99:Daniel ROCHE Le Monde des Ombres
84/100:Gunther TEUBNER After Legal Instrumentalism? *
84/101:Patrick NERHOT Contribution aux Débats sur le Droit 
Subjectif et le Droit Objectif comme 
Sources du Droit *
84/102:Jelle VISSER The Position of Central Confederations 
in the National Union Movements
84/103:Marcello DE CECCO The International Debt Problem in the 
Inter-War Period
84/104:M. Rainer LEPSIUS Sociology in Germany and Austria 1918- 
1945. The Emigration of the Social 
Sciences and its Consequences. The




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE May 1985
Development of Sociology in Germany 
after the Second World War, 1945-1967
84/105:Derek JONES The Economic Performances of Producer 
Cooperations within Command Economies: 
Evidence for the Case of Poland
84/106:Philippe C. SCHMITTER Neo-Corporatism and the State *
84/107:Marcos BUSER Der Einfluss der Wirtschaftsverbaende 
auf Gesetzgebungsprozesse und das 
Vollzugswesen im Bereich des 
Umweltschutzes
84/108:Frans van WAARDEN Bureaucracy around the State:Varieties 
of Collective Self-Regulation in the 
Dutch Dairy Industry
84/109:Ruggero RANIERI The Italian Iron and Steel Industry 
and European Integration




A Non-Linear Model of Fluctuations in 
Output in a Mixed Economy
84/112:Anna Elisabetta GALEOTTI Individualism and Political Theory
84/113:Domenico Mario NUTI Mergers and Disequilibrium in Labour- 
Managed Economies
84/114:Saul ESTRIN/Jan SVEJNAR Explanations of Earnings in 
Yugoslavia: The Capital and Labor 
Schools Compared
84/115:Alan CAWSON/John BALLARD A Bibliography of Corporatism
84/116:Reinhard JOHN On the Weak Axiom of Revealed 




The FRITALUX/FINEBEL Negotiations 
1949/1950
84/118:Pierre DEHEZ Monopolistic Equilibrium and 
Involuntary Unemployment
84/119:Domenico Mario NUTI Economic and Financial Evaluation of 
Investment Projects; General 
Principles and E.C. Procedures




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE May 1985
84/120:Marcello DE CECCO Monetary Theory and Roman History
84/121:Marcello DE CECCO International and Transnational 
Financial Relations
84/122:Marcelio DE CECCO Modes of Financial Development: 




Multisectoral Models and Joint 
Production
84/124:John FARQUHARSON The Management of Agriculture and 
Food Supplies in Germany, 1944-47
84/125:Ian HARDEN/Norman LEWIS De-Legalisation in Britain in the 
1980s *
84/126:John CABLE Employee Participation and Firm 
Performance. A Prisoners' Dilemma 
Framework
84/127:Jesper JESPERSEN Financial Model Building and 
Financial Multipliers of the 
Danish Economy
84/128:Ugo PAGANO Welfare, Productivity and Self- 
Management
84/129:Maureen CAIN Beyond Informal Justice *
85/130:0tfried HOEFFE Political Justice - Outline of a 
Philosophical Theory
85/131:Stuart J. WOOLF Charity and Family Subsistence: 
Florence in the Early Nineteenth 
Century
85/132:Massimo MARCOLIN The Casa d'Industria in Bologna during 
the Napoleonic Period: Public Relief 
and Subsistence Strategies
85/133:Osvaldo RAGGIO Strutture di parentela e controllo 
delle risorse in un'area di transito: 
la Val Fontanabuona tra Cinque e 
Seicento
85/134:Renzo SABBATINI Work and Family in a Lucchese Paper- 
Making Village at the Beginning of the 
Nineteenth Century




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE May 1985
85/135:Sabine JURATIC Solitude féminine et travail des 
femmes à Paris à la fin du XVIIIème 
siècle
85/136:Laurence FONTAINE Les effets déséquilibrants du 
colportage sur les structures de 
famille et les pratiques économiques 
dans la vallée de l'Oisans, 18e-19e 
siècles
85/137:Christopher JOHNSON Artisans vs. Fabricants: Urban 
Protoindustrialisation and the 
Evolution of Work Culture in 
Lodève and Bédarieux, 1740-1830
85/138:Daniela LOMBARDI La demande d'assistance et les répon­
ses des autorités urbaines face à 
une crise conjoncturelle: Florence 
1619-1622
85/139:Orstrom MOLLER Financing European Integration: 
The European Communities and the 
Proposed European Union.
85/140:John PINDER Economic and Social Powers of the 
European Union and the Member States : 
Subordinate or Coordinate Relation­
ship
85/141:Vlad CONSTANTINESCO La Repartition des Competences 
Entre l'Union et les Etats Membres 
dans le Projet de Traite' Instituant 
l'Union Européenne.
85/142:Peter BRUECKNER Foreign Affairs Power and Policy 
in the Draft Treaty Establishing 
the European Union.
85/143:Jan DE MEYER Belgium and the Draft Treaty 
Establishing the European Union.
85/144:Per LACHMANN The Draft Treaty Establishing the 
European Union:
Constitutional and Political 
Implications in Denmark.
85/145:Thijmen KOOPMANS The Judicial System Envisaged in 
the Draft Treaty.
85/146:John TEMPLE-LANG The Draft Treaty Establishing the 
European Union and the Member




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE May 1985
States: Ireland
85/147:Carl Otto LENZ The Draft Treaty Establishing the 
European Union: Report on the Fede­




The Draft Treaty establishing the 
European Union: Report on the United 
Kingdom
85/149:Joseph J. M. VAN DER VEN Les droits de l'Homme: leur universa­
lité1 en face de la diversité' des 
civilisations. *
85/150:Ralf ROGOWSKI Meso-Corporatism and Labour Conflict 
Resolution *
85/151 :Jacques GENTON Problèmes Constituionnels et Politi­
ques poses en France par une éventuel­
le ratification et mise en oeuvre du 
projet de Traite d'Union Européenne
85/152:Marjanne de KWAASTENIET Education as a verzuiling phenomenon 
Public and independent education in 
the Nederlands
85/153 Gianfranco PASQUINO 
and Luciano BARDI
The Institutions and the Process of 
Decision-Making in the Draft Treaty
85/154:Joseph WEILER
and James MODRALL
The Creation of the Union and Its 
Relation to the EC Treaties
85/155:François DUCHENE Beyond the first C.A.P.
85/156:Domenico Mario NUTI Political and Economic Fluctuations 
in the Socialist System
85/157Gianfranco POGGI Niklas Luhmann on the Welfare State 
and its Law
85/158:Christophe DEISSENBERG On the Determination of Macroeconomic 
Policies with Robust Outcome
85/159:Pier Paolo D'ATTORRE ERP Aid and the Problems of 
Productivity in Italy during the 1950s
85/160:Hans-Georg DEGGAU Ueber einige Voraussetzungen und 
Folgen der Verrechtlichung
85/161 :Domemco Mario NUTI Orwell's Oligarchic Collectivism as an 
Economic System




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE May 1985
85/162:Will BARTLETT Optimal Employment and Investment 
Policies in Self-Financed Produce 
Cooperatives
85/163:Terence DAINTITH The Design and Performance of Long­
term Contracts
85/164:Roland BIEBER The Institutions and Decision-Making 
Process in the Draft Treaty 
Establishing the European Union
85/165:Philippe C. SCHMITTER Speculations about the Prospective 
Demise of Authoritarian Regimes and 
its possible Consequences
85/166:Bruno P. F. WANROOIJ The American 'Model' in the Moral 
Education of Fascist Italy
85/167:Th. E. ABELTSHAUSER/ 
Joern PIPKORN
Zur Entwicklung des Europaeischen 
Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrechts
85/168:Philippe MIOCHE Les difficultés de la modernisation 
dans le cas de l'industrie française 






Subjective Price Search and Price 
Competition
85/171:Hans-Ulrich THAMER Work Practices of French Joiners and 
Cabinet-Makers in the Eighteenth 
Century







Political Exchange in the Italian
85/175:Michela NACCI Tra America e Russia: Viaggiatori 
francesi degli anni trenta
85/176:J.LOUGHLIN The Corsican Statut Particulier: A 
Response to the Problem Corse



























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 1985
85/177:Alain DIECKHOFF L'Europe Politique et le Conflit 
Israelo-Arabe
85/178:Dwight J. JAFFEE Term Structure Intermediation by 
Depository Institutions
85/179:Gerd WEINRICH Price and Wage Dynamics in a Simple 
Macroeconomic Model with Stochastic 
Rationing
85/180:Domenico Mario NUTI Economic Planning in Market Economies: 
Scope, Instruments, Institutions
85/181:Will BARTLETT Enterprise Investment and Public 
Consumption in a Self-Managed Economy
85/182:Alain SUPIOT Groupes de Societes et Paradigme de 
1'Entreprise
85/183:Susan Senior Nello East European Economic Relations: 
Cooperation Agreements at Government 
and Firm Level
85/184:Wolfgang WESSELS Alternative Strategies for 
Institutional Reform
85/185:Ulrich BAELZ Groups of Companies - the German 
Approach: "Unternehmen" versus 
"Konzern"
85/186:Will BARTLETT and 
Gerd WEINRICH
Instability and Indexation in a 
Labour-managed Economy
85/187:Jesper JESPERSEN Some Reflections on the Longer Term 
Consequences of a Mounting Public Debt
85/188:Jean GABSZEWICZ
and Paolo GARELLA
Scattered Sellers and Ill-informed 
Buyers: A Model for Price Dispersion
85/189-.Carlo TRIGILIA Small-firm Development, Political 
Subcultures and Neo-localism in 
Italy
85/190:Bernd MARIN Generalized Political Exchange. 
Preliminary Considerations



























































































- • ■: -
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
h
I <
kiüi j+M
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
